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The focus of this article is on the specific affective organization of the self in a
value crisis. Whereas the self is conceptualized as an organized system of personal
meanings, a value crisis is defined as a disorganization of this system. Personal
meanings were investigated using a self-confrontation method that is sensitive to
the affective properties of personal meanings and their organization into a composite
whole. Three groups of students were compared, one high, one medium, and one
low in value crisis. Results indicate that the high crisis group had a lower level of
intensity of affect referring to self-enhancement, a lower intensity level of affect
referring to contact and union with the other, and a lower level of positive affect
in comparison with the other groups. In addition, negative meanings were more
generalizing in the self of subjects in crisis, whereas positive meanings were more
generalizing in the self system of those not in crisis. Moreover, people in crisis
showed more discontinuity between their past and future than those not in crisis.
Special emphasis was placed on the specific affective organization of subjects in
crisis. Two idiographic case studies were presented to illustrate meaningful excep-
tions to the rule. It was concluded that value crisis is an ‘‘in-between state’’ involv-
ing the risk of disorganization of the self, but at the same time including opportuni-
ties for innovative self-development.  1996 Academic Press, Inc.
VALUE CRISIS: AFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF
PERSONAL MEANINGS
Most psychological studies of human values are focused on differences
in value preferences of groups or individuals or on the relationships between
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values and other variables (e.g., Chin & McClintock, 1993; Guastello, Rieke,
Guastello, & Billings, 1992; Maio & Olson, 1994; Pfeiffer & Cote, 1991;
Prince, 1993; Shrum & McCarty, 1992). Other researchers are more inter-
ested in the existence of general dimensions in the domain of values (e.g.,
Allport, 1937; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Despite such dif-
ferences, a variety of authors, representing different theoretical and method-
ological traditions, emphasize the importance of a value system and valuing
process for the self (Allport, 1937; Feather, 1975, 1988; Maslow, 1971; Rog-
ers, 1964; Rokeach, 1973, 1985).
Whereas humanistically oriented authors (Maslow, 1971; Rogers, 1964)
and cognitively oriented writers (Rokeach, 1973, 1985; Feather, 1975, 1988)
have pointed to the general relevance of values for personality integration
and well-being, we deal with more specific questions: What personal mean-
ings are involved when we speak about values? How do people organize
their selves when they experience a value crisis? What are the affective char-
acteristics of the self when people are in a value crisis and, in particular,
how is their well-being?
In addressing these questions, we present the several parts of this article
in the following order: (a) description of valuation theory as a conceptual
framework for the investigation of the affective characteristics of the per-
sonal meaning system; (b) a self-confrontation method based on valuation
theory that allows for the investigation of personal meanings as an organized
whole; and (c) an empirical comparison between groups of students high,
medium, and low in value crisis, with attention to the organization of af-
fective meanings and exceptions to the general findings. Finally, the rele-
vance of the notion of affective organization will be discussed.
VALUATION THEORY: PERSONAL VALUATION AS A PROCESS
OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION
A person, reflecting on his or her daily experiences, is involved in meaning
construction, a process that is central to valuation theory (Hermans, 1987a,b,
1988, 1989; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995). The view of the person in
this theory is inspired by such philosophical–phenomenological thinkers as
James (1890) and Merleau-Ponty (1945). The theory conceives of the self
as an organized process of valuation. The ‘‘process’’ aspect refers to the
historical nature of human experience and implies a spatio-temporal orienta-
tion. The individual lives in a present situation and is, from a specific point
in space and time, oriented to past and future and to the surrounding world.
The ‘‘organizational’’ aspect points to the fact that the individual not only
orients successively to different parts of his or her spatio-temporal situation,
but also brings those parts together in a story or self-narrative. In this story
the several experiences are placed as parts in a composite whole, in which
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one experience is accorded a more influential place than another. In telling
this story, the individual has the capacity for self-reflection, connecting the
different experiences from different moments and periods with one another
and organizing them as parts of a system of personal meanings.
The central concept, ‘‘valuation,’’ refers to any unit of meaning in which
the events of a self-narrative are organized. It has a positive (pleasant), nega-
tive (unpleasant), or ambivalent connotation in the eyes of the individual.
Personal valuations, as subjective constructions of personal experiences, re-
fer to a broad range of phenomena such as: a dear memory, a pleasant activ-
ity, a disappointment in a contact with a significant other, a particular source
of satisfaction, an unreachable ideal, etc. During different periods of one’s
life, different valuations may emerge because the individual’s reference point
is constantly changing. Through the act of self-reflective telling, these valua-
tions are organized in a valuation system. This system can be seen as a com-
posite made up of constant and changing valuations.
It is assumed that each valuation carries an affective connotation; that is,
each valuation has a certain degree of personal involvement and reflects a
particular set of feelings (a particular profile of affect). When we know which
types of affect are characteristic of a particular valuation, we know some-
thing about the valuation itself. This also implies that the affective meaning
of valuation cannot be separated from it.
Manifest versus Latent Level of Organization
The phenomenological richness of personal valuations, which may vary
not only between individuals but also within a single individual across time
and space, represents the manifest level of personality. At the latent level,
however, a limited number of basic motives exist that are reflected in the
affective component of the valuation system. Study of the affective compo-
nent can therefore reveal which particular motive is active in a particular
valuation and in the system as a whole. Two basic motives, in particular,
have been taken into consideration to characterize the affective component
of the valuation system: the striving for self-enhancement, or S motive (self-
maintenance and self-expansion), and the longing for contact and union with
the other, or O motive (orientation toward other people and the surrounding
world). This distinction concerning the basic duality of human experience
has been present in the literature in the writings of various authors: Bakan
(1966) viewed agency and communion as fundamental dynamic principles;
Angyal (1965) relied on the concept of autonomy (or self-determination) and
homonomy (or self-surrender); Klages (1948) considered Bindung (solidifi-
cation) and Lo¨sung (dissolution) to be two basic human motives; and Mc-
Adams (1985) has distinguished power and intimacy as basic motives in a
narrative context. Recently, the dimensions of individualism–collectivism
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and idiocentricism–allocentrism, again suggesting the basic character of the
S and O motives, have been extensively discussed and investigated (Triandis,
Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Schwartz, 1990; Lau, 1992).
An example may clarify the relationship between the basic motives and
the affective component of a valuation. When a person says ‘‘I finished my
studies by working hard,’’ this person may feel ‘‘pride’’ and ‘‘strength’’ in
association with this valuation. It is supposed that the self-enhancement (S)
motive is expressed in these feelings as part of the valuation. Similarly, when
a person says, ‘‘I enjoyed the time that I spent with my friend in France,’’
feelings of tenderness and intimacy may be experienced in close relation with
this valuation. These feelings, then, are considered to be the affective expres-
sion of the motive for contact and union with the other (O). It should be noted,
however, that it is not our intention to exclude other theoretically well-founded
motives which could also be incorporated into valuation theory.
In close correspondence with S and O feelings, well-being, in the form
of the difference between positive and negative feelings, plays a central role
in valuation theory. The rationale is that on their path toward fulfillment of
basic motives, people meet obstacles. We are purposefully oriented to the
world, but obstacles often prevent the achievement of our goals, resulting
in negative feelings. On the other hand, when we achieve something, or
succeed in overcoming obstacles and hindrances, we are rewarded with posi-
tive feelings. It is supposed that each valuation is associated with a pattern
of positive and negative feelings so that the difference between both types
of affect may give information about the extent to which our basic motives
are gratified.
Generalization and Idealization
There are two concepts, generalization and idealization, that particularly
represent the dynamic nature of valuation theory and play a central role in
the methodology presented in the following section. The more a particular
valuation generalizes as part of the system, the more it determines the ‘‘gen-
eral feeling’’ of the person under consideration. When one asks a person
how he or she feels in general, it is highly probable that particular experi-
ences color this general feeling more than others. For example, if the person
is living in a period of serious conflict with his or her spouse, there is a
good chance that the feelings associated with this conflict are more likely
to determine the person’s general feelings in this period than, for example,
the good contact this person experiences with his or her team mates. In other
words, not all valuations are equally influential in the system. The more
generalizing power a valuation has, the more influential the affective compo-
nent of this valuation is in coloring the way the person generally feels in a
certain period of life.
In a similar way, valuations may differ in the extent of idealization. The
VALUE CRISIS: AFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF PERSONAL MEANINGS 461
basic idea is that certain valuations fit more with the way an individual ideally
would like to feel. Valuations that color the ideal feeling are often different
from those that influence the general feeling. In particular, this is the case
when people are actually going through a period in which they are faced
with personal problems which affect their selves to a significant degree. Un-
der such circumstances the ideal feeling typically has an affective modality
that is in contrast to the affective modality of the general feeling.
Value Crisis as a Disorganization of the Valuation System
A tenet of valuation theory is that value crisis represents a transient or
more enduring state of disorganization of the valuation system (Hermans &
Hermans-Jansen, 1995). It is supposed that as a result of critical life events or
circumstances (biological, social, or environmental, see Brim & Ryff, 1980)
certain valuations referring to these events or circumstances become included
in the valuation system and, depending on their impact, have a greater or
lesser influence on the affective component of the self system. Important life
events often represent new elements in a person’s world and therefore require
a reorganization of the valuation system. However, this reorganization may
also fail. Sometimes a distressing event or series of events simply are not,
or not yet, integrated into the valuation system, resulting in a disorganization
of the valuation system as a whole. This disorganization is what we call a
value crisis.
A value crisis has three implications. First, the valuations referring to im-
portant life events or situations are important parts of the system, and, conse-
quently, their affective component has a strong generalizing influence in the
system. Second, because critical events or situations leading to a crisis are
often unscheduled (Neugarten, 1968; Glaser & Strauss, 1966) and of a nega-
tive kind (e.g., failures at school, emotional problems with significant others,
or death of a loved one), the valuations referring to these events or circum-
stances are associated with negative rather than positive affect and will have
a low degree of idealization in the system. Third, the new valuations resulting
from critical events or circumstances break the continuity of the valuation
system, so that the valuations referring to the past, present, and future have
different or even contrasting affective components (e.g., a person may be
dissatisfied with the past, but is optimistic about the future). As various au-
thors have suggested (Akhtar, 1984; Brooks-Gunn, Rock, & Warren, 1989;
Handel, 1987; Shmotkin, 1991), the continuity–discontinuity of personal
meanings across changing time orientations is particularly relevant to well-
being and development.
From a theoretical perspective, the distinction between the manifest and
latent levels of functioning is crucial to understanding the organization of the
valuation system. The myriad of possible valuations (different for different
persons, and different for the same person in different periods of life) are
462 HERMANS AND OLES
studied from a limited amount of basic motives. The S motive is particularly
relevant to the notion of value crisis, because a person whose self system is
being influenced by distressing events or circumstances is expected to have
a relatively large number of valuations with a low intensity level of affect
referring to self-enhancement (McCrery, 1979; Oles, 1988; Rogers, 1964).
Similarly, the O motive is relevant to value crisis, because a crisis is typically
characterized by emotional problems in the contact with other people and
with significant others in particular. Therefore, the valuations of people in
value crisis are expected to be associated with a low intensity level of affect
referring to contact and union (e.g., problems in the developmental tasks of
intimacy and generativity, see Erikson, 1963; Farell & Rosenberg, 1981;
Kroger & Haslett, 1991).
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the following hypotheses are
formulated:
1. Subjects in value crisis have more negative and fewer positive valua-
tions than those not in crisis, and the difference between negative and posi-
tive valuations is higher among those in crisis.
2. The valuations from subjects in value crisis have a lower intensity level
of affect referring to self-enhancement, a lower intensity level of affect refer-
ring to contact and union with the other, a lower intensity level of positive
affect, and a higher intensity level of negative affect.
3. For subjects in value crisis, negative valuations show a stronger general-
ization and a lower idealization than for those not in crisis, whereas positive
valuations have a lower generalization and idealization for those in crisis
than for those not in crisis.
4. The valuations referring to the past and the future are more discontinu-
ous for those in crisis than for those not in crisis.
THE SELF-CONFRONTATION METHOD AND
VALUE CRISIS QUESTIONNAIRE
For the study of the organized system of valuations, we used a self-
confrontation method, and for the assessment of value crisis we used a value
crisis questionnaire.
Self-Confrontation Method: Organization of the Valuation System
The Self-Confrontation Method, based on valuation theory, has been de-
vised to assess a person’s valuation system with special attention to its af-
fective organization (Hermans, 1987a,b, 1988, 1992; Hermans & Hermans-
Jansen, 1995). The method contains two main parts: the construction of the
valuations in an interview, and the connection of each valuation with a stan-
dard set of affect-denoting terms. This results in an affect matrix, filled in
by the individual, in which each cell represents the extent to which specific
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affects (columns in the matrix) are characteristic of specific valuations (rows
in the matrix).
Usually, the self-confrontation procedure implies that a series of open
questions are presented to the participant to elicit the valuations. In this study
the usual valuation interview was tailored to Allport’s six value types. This
enabled us to elicit the individual’s personal response as a reaction to All-
port’s general values. With this purpose in mind, we posed the following
questions (the area of theoretical issues may serve as an example of how
valuations were elicited):
Theoretical issues: discovery of truth, cognition, knowledge: (a) How do
you experience these issues in your life? (b) In what way are you personally
engaged in these issues, or how do you realize them? (c) Do you find these
issues important in your life in any other way? (The answers to these ques-
tions are personal valuations).
The questions for each issue are similar. The other issues were character-
ized as follows:
—Economic issues: utilities, practical affairs, wealth.
—Political issues: power, competition, struggle.
—Esthetic issues: beauty, form, harmony.
—Social issues: love of people, altruism.
—Religious issues: God, unity, excellence (see Allport, 1937, pp. 227–
231).
The questions are not devised as stimuli leading to quick responses, but
as invitations to the subjects to reflect on their own lives, and to mention
those matters which they consider as personally relevant. The subjects are
encouraged to phrase the valuations in their own terms so that the formula-
tion is as much as possible in agreement with the intended meaning. Within
any set of questions the subject concentrates on that question which has the
most evocative quality for him or her. It is possible that such a question will
lead to more than one valuation. In order to have some impression of their
temporal orientation, the subjects were also asked to formulate some valua-
tions in relation to their own past and future as relevant to the issues men-
tioned above.
After the formulation of the valuations, a standard list of affect terms is
offered to the subject. Concentrating on a single valuation, subjects are asked
to indicate on a scale of 0–5 to what extent they experience each affect
in connection with the particular valuation. All statements are successively
characterized using the same list of affect terms. The affect terms used in
the present investigation are a list commonly used in valuation research (e.g.,
Hermans, Hermans-Jansen, & Van Gilst, 1987; Hermans, 1987b) and is pre-
sented in Table 1.
The affect terms of Table 1 permit the calculation of a number of indices
that reveal the organization of the valuation system from the perspective of
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TABLE 1
Affect Terms Used in the Self-Confrontation
Method
1. Joy 16. Solidarity
2. Powerlessness 17. Self-confidence
3. Self-esteem 18. Loneliness
4. Anxiety 19. Inner warmth
5. Happiness 20. Trust
6. Worry 21. Inferiority
7. Strength 22. Intimacy
8. Stress 23. Security
9. Enjoyment 24. Anger
10. Caring 25. Despondency
11. Love 26. Pride
12. Self-alienation 27. Energy
13. Unhappiness 28. Disappointment
14. Tenderness 29. Inner calm
15. Guilt 30. Freedom
the basic motives (Hermans, 1987a,b). The indices relevant to the present
study are summarized below.
1. Index S is the sum total of four affect terms expressing self-enhance-
ment: Nos. 3, 7, 17, and 26.
2. Index O is the sum total of four affect terms expressing contact and
union with another: Nos. 10, 11, 14, and 22. (Note that the scores for the
indices S and O range from 0 to 20).
3. Index P is the sum total of ten global positive (pleasant) affects: Nos.
1, 5, 9, 16, 19, 20, 23, 27, 29, 30.
4. Index N is the sum total of ten global negative (unpleasant) affects:
Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 28. (Note that the scores for the indices
P and N range from 0 to 50).
5. For the assessment of the extent of generalization (G) of a valuation
within the system, the following question is asked at the end of the valua-
tion construction phase: ‘‘How do I generally feel these days?’’ This question
does not ask for a specific valuation but is devised to assess the ‘‘general
feeling.’’ The person answers directly with the list of affect terms that was
used for the characterization of the valuations. The product–moment correla-
tion between the pattern of affect that belongs to a specific valuation and
the pattern of affect that belongs to the general feeling is a measure of the
extent of the generalization of this valuation. The more positive the correla-
tion, the more this valuation is supposed to generalize within the system.
For example, when a person is worrying all the time about his or her studies,
it is expected that a valuation referring to this problem (e.g., ‘‘Wherever I
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am, I am always worrying about failing in my studies’’) has a high degree
of generalization in the system. That is, the correlation between the affective
profile belonging to this valuation and the affective profile belonging to the
general feeling is expected to be high.
6. For the assessment of the idealization (I) of a valuation, the question
is posed: ‘‘How would I like to feel?’’ The correlation between the affective
profile belonging to a specific valuation and the affective profile belonging
to the ideal feeling indicates the ideal quality of this valuation. The height
of the correlation indicates the extent of the idealization of the valuation.
The more positive the correlation, the higher the idealization. When a valua-
tion has an affective profile that contrasts with the ideal feeling, this is ex-
pressed in a negative (minus) correlation. (G and I represent the last rows
in the matrix, see Appendix). Note that instead of the correlation coefficient
(r), a distance metric (D) can be used. Index D has the advantage that it is
sensitive to elevation differences between profiles, which seems particularly
relevant in the case of the idealization index. Hermans (1987b) compared r
and D on several sets of valuations and found that the two measures showed
a high degree of correspondence, expressed in a median Spearman rank cor-
relation of 2.93 (a high product–moment correlation coincides with a small
distance). This finding, together with consistency in the use of index (r in-
stead of D) and economy of presentation (one index instead of two indices),
led us to use r as the index for both generalization and idealization. In doing
so, we should be aware, however, that r does not measure elevation differ-
ences, and that even when r and D are highly correlated, they do not capture
identical information.
The first and second indices express two basic motives, S and O. The third
and fourth indices refer to positive and negative feelings that the subjects
may experience when, on their way to gratify their basic motives, they are
confronted with obstacles. For each valuation the S–O and P–N difference
can be determined. The S–O difference indicates the relative intensity of
affect derived from the two basic motives. The P–N difference indicates the
well-being that a person experiences in relation to the specific valuation. (For
reliability and validity data of S, O, P, and N indices see Hermans, 1987b,
p. 166, pp. 169–171; the self-investigation as described above, takes from
about 11/2 to 3 h for each person).
Value Crisis Questionnaire
Value crisis is measured by means of a Value Crisis Questionnaire (VCQ)
(Oles, 1991). The instrument consists of 25 true–false items, which refer to
different difficulties in the valuing process. The items are based on a concep-
tion of crisis as a state of tension and internal disorganization, accompanied
by: (a) an inability to organize personal values into a coherent and hierarchi-
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cally ordered system (e.g., lack of value orientation, or unsolvable conflict
between important values); (b) a sense of loss of values, usually caused by
significant reevaluations (e.g., values that were significant in the past have
lost their relevance for the present); (c) a lack of integration between cogni-
tive, affective, and motivational aspects of the valuing process (e.g., difficul-
ties in choosing between alternatives); and (d) a low sense of value real-
ization (usually caused by inconsistencies between the value system and
behavior or by unattainable goals or purposes). In a crisis, all or a few of
these symptoms may be present, depending on the intensity of the crisis and
the problems involved.
Some examples of items indicative of particular symptoms of value crisis
are presented below:
1. I am able to define clearly what is most important in my life. (F)
2. I often have doubts concerning values and goals which I have chosen.
(T)
3. I think that in general I choose the right goals and means. (F)
4. I feel that I have never realized anything substantial in my life. (T)
The VCQ was constructed and validated in a sample of university students.
The validity of the VCQ was tested by correlating the global score with
Crumbaugh and Maholick’s (1981) Purpose in Life Test (PIL), on the as-
sumption that lowered purpose in life is associated with value crisis as, for
example, expressed in loss of values or lack of value realization (Baumeister,
1989). The correlation between the two scales was high (r 5 .70, p , .001,
n 5 218), suggesting a clear convergence of the two tests. The internal con-
sistency of the VCQ was .90 (Cronbach’s alpha; n 5 218). The test–retest
reliability was .88 (n 5 37) after a two week interval.
Comparison of Valuation Approach and the Measurement of Value Crisis
Some ideas are similar in the two approaches (assessment of valuations
and measurement of value crisis). First, both are focused on valuing as an
organized system: a structuring of parts into some composite whole is
needed. Second, in both approaches valuing is seen as a cognitive–affective
process. A valuation is regarded by Hermans (1987a) as an activity of mean-
ing giving that has the character of a cognitive–affective process; value crisis
(Oles, 1991) is considered as a general state of mind composed of cognitive
and affective aspects.
There are also some differences between the two approaches. First, valua-
tion theory offers a conceptual framework for the self as a composite whole,
whereas the conception of value crisis gives a description of a single phe-
nomenon. Second, according to valuation theory, self-reflection is considered
an activity leading to the construction and reconstruction of personal mean-
ings, whereas value crisis is a state arising from a transitory inability to con-
strue an efficient meaning system.
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Sample
The participants in our study were 48 students from the Catholic Univer-
sity of Lublin, Poland (40 female and 8 male), 22–25 years old (there was
no significant difference in mean age between the sexes). They were adminis-
tered the Value Crisis Questionnaire and the Self-Confrontation Method, as
described. The sample was divided into three groups according to the raw
scores in VCQ: 14 Students (12 female, 2 male) who obtained high scores
on the VCQ, that is, higher than 1/2 SD above the mean (high crisis group;
M 5 24.50, SD 5 8.28), 18 students (14 female, 4 male) who obtained
average scores on the VCQ, that is, lower than 1/2 SD above the mean and
higher than 1/2 SD below the mean (medium crisis group; M 5 8.00, SD 5
1.97), and 16 students (14 female, 2 male) who obtained low scores on the
VCQ, that is, lower than 1/2 SD below the mean (low crisis group; M 5 2.38,
SD 5 2.00). Mean result in VCQ for the whole sample was M 5 19.94, SD
5 10.23. In the following, the total number of valuations from each group
were compared. (Note that the subjects were allowed to respond with more
than one valuation for any issue, if they wanted).
RESULTS: AFFECTIVE PROPERTIES OF VALUE CRISIS
In order to test the first hypothesis, we compared the average number of
valuations produced by three groups (see Table 2; some examples of valua-
tions as typical of each group are presented in Table 5). These averages are
based on the average number of valuations per subject across issues. As can
be seen in Table 2, the high crisis group shows, in accordance with our
expectations, a higher number of negative (p , .05) and a lower number of
positive valuations (p , .05) in comparison with the low crisis group and
the medium crisis group. In spite of these differences between the groups,
there is an important observation to make from an organizational point of
view: within the high crisis group there is no dominance of negative over
positive valuations. Despite the existence of differences between the groups,
TABLE 2
Average Numbers of Positive and Negative Valuations for Groups High, Medium,
and Low in Crisis
Medium Cri-
High Crisis sis Low Crisis Differences
Valuations M SD M SD M SD F(2, 45) p ,
Positive 5.43 2.24 7.83 2.48 9.50 3.26 8.48 .001 ab
Negative 3.93 2.62 1.72 1.67 1.38 1.59 7.32 .005 ab
Total 9.36 2.73 9.89 3.12 11.13 3.40 1.30 —
Note. a 5 difference between groups high and low in crisis, p , .05; b 5 difference between
groups high and medium in crisis, p , .05.
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TABLE 3
Means on the Affective Indices for High, Medium, and Low Crisis Group
High Crisis Medium Crisis Low Crisis Differences
Indices M SD M SD M SD F(2, 45) p ,
S 8.20 2.82 10.82 2.34 12.68 2.89 10.50 .001 abc
O 6.25 2.04 9.77 3.28 9.73 2.90 7.31 .005 ab
P 20.44 6.18 28.55 5.32 32.99 4.61 20.83 .001 abc
N 15.20 4.75 13.43 6.76 10.16 5.57 2.92 —
Note. a 5 difference between groups High and Low in Crisis, p , .05; b 5 difference
between groups High and Medium in Crisis, p , .05; c 5 difference between groups Medium
and Low in Crisis, p , .05; S 5 affect referring to self-enhancement; O 5 affect referring
to contact with the other; P 5 positive affect; N 5 negative affect.
there appears to be an almost equal ratio of positive and negative valuations
within the high crisis group, whereas such a ratio is not found within the
other two groups.
In order to test the second hypothesis, we compared the three groups (high,
medium, and low) on the indices S, O, P, and N (see Table 3) using a one-
way analysis of variance. The means of the groups are based on averages
across issues for each individual. For three of the four indices (S, O, and P),
the differences between the groups are statistically significant, and in the
expected direction: the high crisis group has a lower intensity level of affect
referring to self-enhancement (p , .05), a lower intensity level of affect
referring to contact and union (p , .05), and a lower intensity level of posi-
tive affect (p , .05) than the medium and low crisis groups. Contrary to the
second hypothesis, no significant differences between the groups were found
for negative affect. This suggests that the high crisis group experiences less
positive affect than the other groups, but not more negative affect. There is,
moreover, another finding which does not fit our expectations: whereas the
level of positive (P) feelings exceeds the level of negative (N) feelings to a
large degree within the low crisis group and medium crisis group, a differ-
ence in the opposite direction is not found within the high crisis group. In
the latter group, positive feelings are in fact slightly higher than negative
feelings. Taken together, the results summarized in Table 3 indicate that the
high crisis group is characterized not simply by a high intensity of negative
valuations, but by a mixture of high positive and high negative intensity.
The results concerning the generalization and idealization are presented
in Table 4. In agreement with the third hypothesis we find that, for the high
crisis group, the positive valuations have a lower degree of generalization
and the negative valuations a higher degree of generalization than for the
groups low and medium in crisis (p , .05 for both of the differences). More-
over, the positive valuations have, as expected, a lower degree of idealization
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TABLE 4
Mean Generalization and Idealization for Positive and Negative Valuations for Groups
High, Medium, and Low in Crisis
High Crisis Medium Crisis Low Crisis Differences
Indices M SD M SD M SD F p ,
Positive valuations (P . N ) F(2,45)
G .07 .38 .44 .23 .51 .45 6.48 .005 ab
I .44 .22 .64 .14 .74 .13 12.26 .001 ab
Negative valuations (P , N) F(2,33)
G .30 .29 .04 .24 2.10 .41 5.08 .05 ab
I 2.22 .32 2.30 .22 2.49 .26 2.90 —
Note. a 5 difference between groups High and Low in Crisis, p , .05; b 5 difference
between groups High and Medium in Crisis, p , .05; G 5 generalization, I 5 idealization.
in the high crisis group than in the low and medium crisis groups (p , .05).
In contrast to our expectations, however, there are no significant between-
group differences in the extent of idealization for the negative valuations.
When we compare the results of Tables 3 and 4, we find that the high
crisis group does not lack positive valuations (see Table 3), but these positive
valuations do not generalize (mean correlation is .07, see Table 4). The oppo-
site is true for the two other groups. The participants in these groups do not
lack negative valuations (see Table 3) but these valuations do not generalize
(2.10, and .04 for the low and medium group, respectively; see Table 4).
A more complex picture can be found when we select, in an idiographic
analysis, the highest generalizing valuation from each individual system; that
is, the one which has the highest correlation with the general feeling. The
highest generalizing valuations from all participants, together with their af-
fective patterns, are presented in Table 5.
The advantage of this idiographic exploration is that we can compare the
idiosyncratic content (formulation) of the separate valuations with their af-
fective patterning. As Table 5 shows, various patterns are found in the dif-
ferent groups. For a classification of significant patterns, we follow a typol-
ogy of valuations introduced by Hermans, Hermans-Jansen, and Van Gilst
(1987). Typical valuations for the low and medium crisis groups are those
representing a positive combination of high self-enhancement and high con-
tact and union with the other (high S, high O, high P, low N; e.g., val. nos.
16, 26, 28, 34, and 37). By way of contrast, in the high crisis group one can
see only a few such positive valuations (e.g., val. nos. 7 and 11). On the
other hand, some valuations of the opposite type are found in this group,
representing a negatively experienced combination of low self-enhancement
and low contact and union with the other (low S, low O, low P, high N;
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TABLE 5
The Most Highly Generalizing Valuations Formulated by Students High, Medium,
and Low in Value Crisis
Valuation S O P N G
High crisis group
1. (F)** I would like to know everything clearly, in
truth, so that normal interpersonal relationships be-
come possible. 2 0 1 32 .83
2. (F)** I want to know for sure that God exists, and
acts in my life. 7 0 10 32 .69
3. (F) I want to be needed by others. 16 3 32 0 .93
4. (M)** It is very difficult for me to realize love for
other people in my life. 5 5 17 21 .62
5. (F) There is something in me which causes people—
also dishonest ones—to ask me for help. 5 6 15 28 .63
6. (F)** I like to dominate others but not to have any
real power. 3 0 6 4 .45
7. (F)— The first thing which inspires me to activity is
a sense of esthetic form and beauty. 16 17 43 2 .73
8. (F)** I don’t need to fight, to be famous, or to have
power; that is not for me. 11 1 14 28 .76
9. (F)** I am very absorbed by religious questions,
which disturb me a lot, and I try to find my individ-
ual way of joining my life and religion. 10 7 10 30 .48
10. (F)* I want to be someone who has authority. 16 5 33 10 .61
11. (F) Freedom—I want to act freely and to decide
about my life. I am able to do that, being aware of
limitations. 16 11 37 17 .52
12. (F)** I withdraw from competition and struggle be-
cause it is a more suitable position: neither a winners
nor a losers position is for me (I don’t want to be
last, and to win means that somebody lost). 8 0 6 28 .64
13. (F) I am anxious that I will never gain enough knowl-
edge, and I will never know and learn enough things
to allow me to discover the truth. 0 0 1 41 .70
14. (M) In everyday life I cannot find enough harmony
and beauty, which I associate with real art. 13 18 41 2 .83
Average crisis group
15. (M)* For me studying means to look for unreachable
truth. 13 7 27 24 .46
16. (F) Beauty of the world makes me rich and develops
my sensitivity. 14 17 41 8 .87
17. (F)** I like to smile at people and help them. 10 13 34 3 .44
18. (F) Contact with other people is important to me: to
be together, to make friends, to co-operate, to help. 8 10 29 8 .62
19. (F) Looking for the truth is one of the most signifi-
cant things I can do. 11 8 32 12 .65
20. (F)* I want to notice and to understand the needs of
people who are close to me. 7 12 32 28 .21
VALUE CRISIS: AFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF PERSONAL MEANINGS 471
TABLE 5—Continued
Valuation S O P N G
21. (F)* I love Jack, who gives me support and a sense
of safety. 12 19 37 19 .85
22. (F) Faith in providence allows me to look forward to
the future with optimism. 8 3 32 7 .66
23. (F) The truth gives me a sense of direction of my
life. 20 2 31 11 .42
24. (F) I do my best not to waste my efforts in economic
strivings. 12 13 30 23 .43
25. (F) I am very involved in working on my thesis and I
enjoy it. 14 5 25 13 .60
26. (F)— I am fascinated by travel, curious about how
other people live, watching landscapes, flora, fauna;
however, I realize that I’ll never be able to do it in a
big way. 10 12 32 7 .64
27. (F)* I love the harmony of nature which creates a
peace in me, the same peace I find in music; unfortu-
nately I haven’t enough time for that. 5 14 37 11 .71
28. (M) Truth is the most significant value in my life, it
is a necessary point of reference and verification of
things. 18 20 47 6 .95
29. (F) My religious faith is of the greatest importance
and value to me; thanks to my faith I am able to real-
ize myself in this life, for I am not and I will never
be perfect, and through prayer I meet the greatest Ex-
cellence and I appreciate that He always has time for
me and wants to hear me. 8 9 32 6 .83
30. (F) I often lack money. 1 2 2 18 .19
31. (M) Religion and morality—in what way ought I to
become better and better, how can I make my life
meaningful and useful? 10 11 26 20 .75
32. (M) I would like to gain inner harmony and to find
such harmony in the environment. 11 15 33 7 .82
Low crisis group
33. (F) The theoretical values I find in my study and in
my own research activity. 14 11 38 1 .89
34. (F) Music is everything, music fulfills and enriches
my life. 15 15 41 11 .86
35. (M) Power is attractive to me, because I like to domi-
nate, yet simultaneously I am averse to power, be-
cause I am afraid of people who have power. 6 2 15 15 .55
36. (F)* Love with my boy-friend is the most valuable
and the most beautiful relationship I know. 14 17 46 11 .88
37. (F) I love and I need other people, and they need me;
when I am together with close friends or family I feel
really happy. 20 20 50 0 .99
38. (F) Love gave a beginning to my life; and I hope
love will be with me to the end of my life. 19 20 49 5 .92
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TABLE 5—Continued
Valuation S O P N G
39. (F) Utility of my work—this is what I like, to see the
fruits of my endeavors. 17 12 35 20 .85
40. (F) I am often stubborn, I remember insults for a
long time. 1 0 7 29 .69
41. (F) I like to seek the truth especially when it leads
me to a defined goal, like better relationships with
others. 15 16 41 9 .80
42. (F) I like to give and to get practical gifts. 8 4 29 5 .73
43. (F) I love music. 14 15 41 1 .88
44. (M) I study psychology, I want to understand other
people and myself better. 14 7 27 22 .37
45. (F) I try to be altruistic, and in doing so I influence
others to reflect on themselves. 16 12 42 6 .90
46. (F) God is the source and goal of my life. 20 19 49 9 .90
47. (F) I am afraid of fighting and dishonest competition,
because it causes hate and disaster in a group or
society. 1 0 0 37 .46
48. (F) God’s love penetrates my everyday life, every mo-
ment of it. 16 12 40 4 .82
Note. S 5 affect referring to self-enhancement; O 5 affect referring to contact with the
other; P 5 positive affect; N 5 negative affect; G 5 general feeling; F—female; M—male.
The valuations are ordered according to the results in VCQ. By ** are signed cases which
reveal discontinuity between valuations related to the past and future; by * are signed cases
which reveal continuity as well as discontinuity; — lack of valuations related to the past and
future.
e.g., val. nos. 1 and 13). The affective meaning of such valuations typically
expresses a combination of powerlessness (low S) and isolation (low O).
Another, less obvious type of valuation which appears in the high crisis
group represents a so-called ‘‘negative self-enhancement’’ (high S, low O,
low P, high N; e.g., val. nos. 2, 8, and 12). This type of valuation was found
in an earlier study to be typical of anger and opposition (Hermans, 1992).
As the affective pattern of this type indicates, it is associated with a high
degree of S affect in combination with a high degree of N affect, and repre-
sents, as such, a certain amount of strength combined with negative affect
(e.g., as one can feel when one is angry about something). It suggests that
some people in the high crisis group are not simply powerless and isolated
(as indicated by the combination of low S, low O, low P, and high N), but
also have a tendency to revolt.
Although in the low crisis group and medium crisis group there are
many more high S, high O, high P, low N valuations (e.g., val. nos. 16,
26, 28, 34, 37, and 38), and more high S, low O, high P, low N valuations
(e.g., val. nos. 23, 25, and 44), representing positively experienced self-
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enhancement, than in the high crisis group, some of these positive and highly
generalizing valuations are also found in the high crisis group (val. nos. 3,
7, 10, 11, and 14). This variation suggests that the psychological picture of
a person high in value crisis is not a uniform, but rather a multifaceted one.
Therefore, conclusions about self-organization in value crisis, which are
based on group comparisons, are only to a limited degree interpretable on
the level of individual findings.
Finally, in order to test the fourth hypothesis, we analyzed our data ac-
cording to the dimension of continuity vs. discontinuity. Therefore, we com-
pared the valuations related to the past and future within each subject, with
the purpose of assessing the continuity vs discontinuity of the valuations.
There is ‘‘continuity’’ when a valuation referring to the past represents the
same type as a valuation referring to the future. There is ‘‘discontinuity’’
when valuations referring to the past and those referring to the future repre-
sent different types. Those valuations that are characterized by discontinuity
or by the simultaneous existence of discontinuity and continuity are marked
in Table 5 (note that the subjects were allowed to formulate more than one
valuation relating to the past or future). For all students in the low crisis
group, except one, we find only continuity. In the medium crisis group we
also find much more continuity than discontinuity, whereas for students in
the high crisis group there is much more discontinuity. In only one case (no.
13) do we find ‘‘negative continuity,’’ that is, the valuations related to past
and future are both negative (low S, low O, low P, high N).
In order to get a more complete picture of our findings, we performed an
additional idiographic analysis (for the complementary relationship between
nomothetic and idiographic research, see Allport, 1962; Hermans, 1988, and
Thomae, 1968/1988). We should note that there are some students high in
value crisis who do not reveal discontinuity of personal meanings, nor nega-
tive valuations strongly generalizing in the system (consider val. nos. 3, 7,
11, 14 in Table 5). Why are they diagnosed as being in value crisis? Is value
crisis possible without any clear sign of problem in the most generalizing
valuations in the self-system? Similarly, in the low crisis group we find two
students revealing negative valuations strongly generalizing in the system
(consider val. nos. 40 and 47). One can ask, why do people who are not in
a period of value crisis have a negative well-being? Looking for answers to
such questions, we discuss here the two most exceptional cases in our study.
The first case is selected from the high crisis group and is represented by
valuation no. 3 in Table 5. This subject, Jane, was selected as the participant
in the high crisis group who deviated most: she obtained the third highest
score in the VCQ, but, contrary to our expectation, her most generalizing
valuation is not negative but positive, and, moreover, she shows no disconti-
nuity. All valuations from this student are presented in Table 6.
Referring to the affective pattern of Jane’s general feeling, we suspect
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TABLE 6
Case 3. Subject High in Value Crisis: Jane’s Valuations and Indices
Indices
Nos. Valuations S O P N G I
1. I know that I should learn more, but I often
don’t have enough energy to do so. 4 2 15 19 .00 .22
2. When I have money I enjoy spending it; when
I lack money I try to be more thrifty. 0 0 5 0 .41 .52
3. I hate ugliness and I look for beauty anywhere
it can be found. 0 6 25 0 .47 .55
4. To be open to others—which I find difficult—
gives me real satisfaction and a sense of
unity with the world. 13 14 41 10 .75 .56
5. I don’t like it when somebody manipulates
me, or uses their superiority over me. 4 0 2 4 .17 2.03
6. Perfection means for me to live in harmony
with myself, not to harm other people, with
God as my centre of support. 7 0 17 10 .36 .48
7. In the past, religion was the most important
thing for me. 10 8 34 0 .82 .58
8. I want to be needed by others. 16 3 32 0 .93 .52
General feeling 15 5 33 0 — .55
Ideal feeling 4 4 30 6 .55 —
Note. S 5 affect referring to self-enhancement; O 5 affect referring to contact with the
other; P 5 positive affect; N 5 negative affect; G 5 generalization; I 5 idealization.
that she is primarily oriented toward the realization of her self-enhancement
motive (S . O). However, on the explored areas of her present personal
experience (val. nos. 1–6), she cannot find much satisfaction in her life (with
the exception of val. no. 4). The most highly generalizing valuations are the
ones which refer to the past (val. no. 7) and to the future (val. no. 8). This
suggests that her general feeling is not strongly supported by the valuations
referring to her present situation. That is, she is only able to fulfill her basic
motives to a limited degree and, therefore, she turns back to the positive experi-
ences in her past and finds some compensation in her wishes for the future.
The second case is selected from the low crisis group and is represented
by valuation 47 in Table 5. This participant, Joan, obtained the second lowest
score in the VCQ. Her highest generalizing valuation, however, is very nega-
tive, which is atypical of the low crisis group. All her valuations are presented
in Table 7.
At a first glance, Joan’s system reveals some very positive valuations
which have minus correlations with the general feeling (val. nos. 1, 3, 4, 7,
8, 9, and 10). In spite of the many positive valuations with high levels of self-
enhancement and contact and union, Joan’s general feeling is very negative.
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TABLE 7
Case 47. Subject Low in Value Crisis: Joan’s Valuations and Indices
Indices
Nos. Valuations S O P N G I
1. Gaining knowledge thanks to my studies I
can better understand the other person. 12 9 35 7 2.23 .82
2. Wealth makes a person insensitive to the
needs of other people. 1 2 3 34 .43 2.74
3. The beauty of nature makes me happy. 12 14 42 6 2.52 .89
4. When I love I feel satisfied and happy. 17 17 45 2 2.46 .95
5. Power, conceived as superiority over oth-
ers, destroys relationships between peo-
ple. 9 0 1 43 .43 2.83
6. I am afraid of fighting and dishonest com-
petition, because it causes hate and
disaster in a group or society. 1 0 0 37 .46 2.78
7. I refer all my activity to God. 14 19 47 1 2.46 .93
8. Unity with God gives me inner calm and
harmony. 14 20 50 2 2.47 .94
9. Religion and involvement in helping other
people have influenced my life. 14 17 47 3 2.44 .94
10. God, unity, love, and knowledge will
make me able to discover the richness
of others, and of myself. 15 18 44 7 2.43 .91
11*. I feel deep sorrow after my grandmother’s
death, she was very close to me; the
death set her free from suffering, but I
missed being with her during her last
hours. 4 4 8 30 1.00 2.32
General feeling 4 4 8 30 — 2.32
Ideal feeling 10 14 43 0 2.32 —
Note. S 5 affect referring to self-enhancement; O 5 affect referring to contact with the
other; P 5 positive affect; N 5 negative affect; G 5 generalization; I 5 idealization.
* Participants were allowed to add valuation(s), if there was something very important in
their life which was not covered by the valuations generated on the basis of the standard sets
of questions.
Apparently, her general feeling has the same affective pattern as a recent
painful experience reported in valuation no. 11. Thus, negative well-being
is caused by a stressful life event, which at the time of investigation had a
strong generalizing power. This experience was so influential that the other,
more positive meanings were pushed into the background of the system. In
other words, negative well-being may be caused by reasons other than value
crisis and does not necessarily imply an emphasis of negative valuations in
the system as a whole.
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DISCUSSION
There are two ways of studying the affective properties of value crisis.
The first is to perform a comparative study between groups in order to assess
the differences in the separate variables included in the study. The second
is to examine the organization of the variables within a person or a group
of persons. Let us consider the results of our study from both perspectives.
When we compare the participants of our study on separate variables, the
results can be summarized thus: the group high in value crisis had more
negative and less positive valuations than the groups medium and low in
value crisis. Moreover, the high crisis group had a low intensity level of
affect referring to self-enhancement, a low intensity level of affect referring
to contact and union with other people, and a low intensity level of positive
affect, in comparison with the groups low or medium in value crisis. The
extent of generalization also showed significant differences: In the high crisis
group negative valuations were most generalizing, whereas in the low crisis
group positive valuations had the most generalizing influence. So far, the
results are in accordance with our expectations and, moreover, the results
seem fairly intuitive. When, on the other hand, we consider the results from
an organizational point of view, we may ask how people in a period of value
crisis organize their selves. When the question is posed this way, the differ-
ence between separate variables is not of prime importance but rather the
patterning of variables is what first draws our attention. When we consider
our study from this perspective, the results represent a higher level of com-
plexity and are less intuitive. Conceiving value crisis as an organized process
of valuation, we are particularly interested in the way in which subjects high
in value crisis order their personal meanings. We found that for subjects
high in value crisis, the level of positive affect exceeded the level of negative
affect to some degree, although the valuations associated with this positive
affect did not generalize in the system.
When we focused on the valuations that are most generalizing within the
system, we found that the high crisis group includes a variety of types of
valuations in the system, some of which were positive, others negative. This
variation was also revealed when we examined, in an idiographic analysis,
the valuations of our most exceptional cases. Taken together, these results
suggest that the psychological pictures of the participants in our study are
different when considering them in a between system comparison than when
studying them in a within system analysis. The within system comparison
suggests that participants high in value crisis have a specific way of organiz-
ing their selves. They have the capacity to include a broad range of experi-
ences, but are unable or unwilling to let one type of valuation dominate the
system as a whole. They have a mixture of contrasting types of experiences,
without giving one of these types a dominating position in the organized
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self-system. One may look at this type of organization in different ways. On
the positive side, the high crisis group has broadened their horizon which
opens new possibilities for growth and development in a multitude of direc-
tions. On the negative side, this way of organizing the self may result in a
sense of confusion and loss of direction that Erikson (1959) and others (e.g.,
Cote & Levine, 1987, 1988) have so well described.
The organization of the multifaceted selves of the high crisis group resem-
bles, to some degree, the so-called self-schemas in mildly depressed patients
and in normal people with a depressive mood (Alloy & Lipman, 1992;
Kuiper, Olinger, & Swallow, 1987; Sutton, Teasdale, & Broadbent, 1988).
Their self-schema consists of both positive and negative aspects of the self
and is weakly consolidated in contrast with normal and deeply depressed
people whose self-schema are strongly consolidated and consist of positive
or negative elements. As Dance and Kuiper (1987) suggest, mild depressives
have begun to include negative information in their view of self and are
perhaps questioning the applicability of existing positive features. These pro-
cesses produce the inefficiency and inconsistency of self-referent processing,
as similarly observed in value crisis.
The conclusion, as formulated above, is in line with the results on the
continuity/discontinuity issue. The finding that some people high in value
crisis refer to different types of valuation in their past as compared to their
future is again an observation that touches the organizational feature of the
self-system. Taken together with the other findings, this way of organizing
the self suggests that the participants high in value crisis are searching for
a positive direction in life, without being very sure of the right direction.
Whereas they typically refer to negative valuations in their past or present,
they refer to positive valuations in their future. This means that they do not
find themselves in a situation of hopelessness or helplessness, but rather in
a state of tension and uncertainty that marks an experiential field between
negative and positive experiences. It is relevant to add that the tendency to
assess future aspects of self more optimistically than past and present ones
is typical of young adults (Ryff, 1991). Simultaneously, negative possible
selves, feared or undesired ones, in combination with positive selves create
a motivation to realize desired ones, and may work in developmentally bene-
ficial ways (Oyserman & Markus, 1990).
Although the existence of an experiential field between positive and nega-
tive experience may work out in beneficial ways, one should not be blind
to the costs. The problematic aspects of this kind of self-organization were
emphasized by Campbell (1990), who examined the association between
affective and knowledge components of the self. She found that the self-
concept of low self-esteem subjects (comparable with our high crisis sub-
jects) was characterized by less clarity or certainty than that of high self-
esteem subjects (comparable with our low crisis subjects). When we inspect
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the content (formulation) of the highest generalizing valuations in the high
crisis group (Table 5), we see that some of the subjects in this group explic-
itly refer to a need for clarity or certainty (e.g., ‘‘I would like to know every-
thing clearly. . . ,’’ see valuation 1, and ‘‘I want to know for sure that God
exists. . .’’ see valuation 2). Such valuations were not found in the low and
middle crisis groups. These observations, in combination with the existence
of discontinuity between past and future, suggest that people in crisis are
searching for new directions but are, at the same time, plagued by a lack of
clarity and certainty about themselves and the world.
Given their extended field of experience, it is too simple to consider people
in a period of value crisis as dysfunctional or even as being in a transitory
state of dysfunction. Given the tensions brought about by the apparent uncer-
tainty and unclarity, it is also too simple to see them as functioning in effi-
cient and productive ways. Value crisis is rather a period of ‘‘new possibili-
ties with considerable mental risks.’’ In Chinese, the word ‘‘crisis’’ has two
meanings: ‘‘danger’’ and ‘‘opportunity.’’ This is precisely what a value crisis
means: it is an ‘‘in-between state’’ that involves the risk of disorganization
of personality functioning, but at the same time offers opportunities for inno-
vative self-development.
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